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COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ECONOMIC
IMPROVISATION BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX t

Hard times beget social experimentation. The inevitable disintegration of economic optimism and psychological stability forces government into the front line of remedial action. The people, directly
affected by the disruption of normal processes, are ready to sanction
bold defiance of precedent in the management of public affairs. In
such periods, they are least inclined to condone passivity on the part of
their representative organs.' That "something has to be done" is
eminently clear to every one. It is usually far less clear exactly what
has to be done. One general proposition, however, can be advanced
without hesitation. In the economic era of machine production and
in the political era of the nation-state, the natural prerogative of social
redress lies with the largest unit of government rather than with its
subdivisions. The programmatic design of planned activity in the
conquest of industrial crisis must be reasonably uniform for the entire
country. Otherwise it would be apt to remain ineffectual. Nation2
wide depressions cannot successfully be attacked locally.
While this general proposition may be said today to be founded on
an abundance of practical experience, there is nevertheless ample opportunity for public authorities, operating within local jurisdictions, to
engage in economic improvisation. As long as such improvisation
methodically implements wider programs, it may well be a wholly
desirable demonstration of local initiative. The same cannot always
be said of similar measures that are conceived without reference to a
broader framework of concerted effort. Here, however, we shall concern ourselves with the economic implications only incidentally. The
t J. D., 1922, University of Hamburg, Germany; Associate Professor of Political
Science, Queens College; Lecturer in Government, Graduate School, New York University; author of Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of Discretion
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I. Significantly, in his recent address on "Engineering in an American Program
for Social Progress", Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, has taken the government to task for having been "relatively inactive"
in elaborating permanent solutions for our unemployment problem. THORNTON, ed.,
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1939)

500.

2. The implications for local authorities are fully presented and examined by
WELLS, AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (939)
passim, especially at 137 et seq. Here
as elsewhere, the formula for the future must be intelligent and responsive cooperation
between the municipalities and the Federal Government.
(425)
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theme of this article is rather the legal problem involved in the pursuit
of home-made economic policies by public authorities servicing local
areas. The approach will be, again, comparative and in terms of "situational" case analysis.3
I

The first case ' to be examined leads us into the law of public contracts.5' The case deals with stipulations written by a municipal body
into contracts let for the construction of an improvement; these stipulations aimed to mitigate the local unemployment situation. For our
purposes, the motive itself is more important than the fact that it found
expression in contractual form. What gives the case particular significance for our theme is the legal principle to be derived from it, not its
special relevance to the law of public contracts. Let us remember,
however, that the different levels of government control a considerable
share of construction activity throughout the land. Quite obviously,
in times of widespread chronic unemployment, contractual stipulations
inspired by the thought of creating work are bound to retain their attraction to public bodies.8 The marked trend toward "special authorities" in recent years, 7 moreover, has continued to broaden the poten3. For the methodological prototype, see Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of Discretion (939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 954. The
most recent English literature on French and German administrative law is listed id.
at 955, n. 4. The practical relevance of a comparative approach based on "situational"
case analysis is outlined id. at 955-956, n. 5.
4. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P. (2d) 59i (1932), 80 U. OF PA. L.
Rav. 1167.
5. The term is not free from ambiguity. Its meaning is more often implied than
expressly stated. DONNELLY, LAW OF PUBLIC CONTACrS (1922), for instance, does
not give an exact definition of public contracts. He appears to use the term in application to any contract made by a body corporate and politic with an individual, a private
corporation, or with another such body. To him, "a public contract is measured and
governed by the same laws that control natural persons in contract matters, whether it
be the nation, State, city, town or village". Id. § 82. There is room, however, for a
terminological distinction between contracts among public bodies exclusively, and contracts made by public bodies with individuals or private corporations; and, in this latter
group, further between such contracts as relate to the exercise of governmental authority (e. g., contractual settlement of governmental tax claims with the taxpayer), contracts let for public works and improvements (e. g., contracts belonging to the same
category as that presented in our first case above), and contracts that are merely incidental to current operations of public management (e. g., purchase of office supplies).
The most detailed grouping of public contracts is offered in Jkzr, LEs PRINcIPrs GtNERAUX DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (3d ed. 1925-1936) vol. 3, 297 et seq., and vols. 4-6.
On the power of dispensation in administrative law, see Note (I939) 87 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 201. For the present purpose, it is not essential to define public contracts in terms
narrower than implied by Donnelly, even though "the law of government contract differs at certain vital points from the law of public contract". FIELD, RESEARCHI IN ADMiNISTRA-rvw LAw (938) 33.
6. It should not be overlooked that both in fact and in law there is a difference
between such stipulations incorporated into public contracts in response to statutory
mandate and identical clauses inserted without such express authorization. Statutory
provisions of this kind are becoming more frequent. On the Walsh-Healey Act and
the regulation of conditions in government contracts made under it, see Note (937)
8 5 U. OF PA. L. REV. 297; SHEALEY, LAW OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACrs (3d ed. 1938)

§ 266.

7. The tax and debt limits imposed by states upon their local governments have
contributed to the proliferation of special districts and separate authorities. Under the
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tial area of public contracts, and with it the incidence of clauses either
framed to meet specific policies of the public party or simply thoughtlessly onerous to the private party. 8 No doubt, the legal questions
arising from such clauses warrant greater attention than they have
hitherto received.
The board of commissioners of Salt Lake City, in awarding contracts for the construction of a system of storm sewers, inserted into
the contracts a number of unusual clauses. In the first place, the contractors had to agree that all construction materials, where there was no
substantial difference in price to them, should be Salt Lake City products and manufacture; if not procurable in Salt Lake City, they should
New Deal, the flow of grants and loans made by the Federal Government to local units
could not fail to accentuate this undesirable tendency. "A veritable mushroom crop of
separate authorities has been the result." WELLS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9i. The
new authority arose largely as "a legalistic device to enable a community, in debt to its
ears and unable to borrow in its own name, to get money from Uncle Sam". Davis,
Borrowing Machines (1935) 24 NAT. MuN. REv. 328. The legal status of such authorities can no longer be considered in doubt. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 36
Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934). The question may well be raised whether or not the new
authority is "a mere camouflage for improvident spending, an unnecessary and vicious
decentralization of power and responsibility, leading to political abuses- more abundant
and harder to cure". Davis, supra, at 334. Whatever the reply, this much can
be said in general: that the spread of separate authorities in the intrastate area imperils
the organizational unity of local government and poses additional problems of governmental control. The danger of laxity, both fiscal and legal, is greater here than elsewhere. By its very character, the new authority, in promoting its purposes, is apt to
rely on contractual arrangements rather than administrative power. Under the circumstances, the problem of special clauses in public contracts is today of increasing relevance. See note 5 supra.
8. One important category of special clauses in public contracts provides machinery
for the non-judicial decision of certain questions that may arise in the execution of the
contract. The borderline of validity is not always easily drawn. DONNELLY, op. cit.
supra note 5, § 152, states the principal considerations as follows (his citations are omitted) : "It is an incident or term of every contract that the parties shall have the right
to resort to a court of law for a settlement and adjustment of their disputes. Any provision to the contrary is void because in contradiction to the rest of the contract . . .
Parties to a contract cannot, therefore, undertake an independent stipulation or agreement for the settlement and adjustment of all disputes by arbitration and deny jurisdiction to the ordinary tribunals provided by law. They will be permitted, however, by
the same agreement which creates an obligation and gives a right of action for its nonperformance, to qualify the right, by requiring that before a cause of action shall arise
certain facts shall be determined or amounts or values ascertained and arrived at, or
that a third person must perform specific acts or determine certain questions, and they
may make this a condition precedent to suit. Where a stipulation or agreement submits all future controversies to arbitration, whether the rights impaired flow out of the
contract or independently of it, as from negligence, such provision is invalid as ousting
the courts of jurisdiction. Agreements to submit all disputes to arbitration on questions
of price, value, quantity or damage only, are valid and do not oust the courts. Provisions
for arbitration which are indefinite, impracticable and unreasonable will not be sustained . . . But where it limits the questions to the amount or quantity of work to
be paid for, and to all questions relative to fulfillment, it does not offend the rule and
the certificate of the engineer in these respects is a necessary precedent fact to a recovery. In like manner provisions for the settlement of all disputes as to extra work
will be upheld, if they merely qualify the right of action by providing a method under
which certain facts shall be determined and amounts and values ascertained, as a condition precedent to action . . . Though a contractor is not bound by the decision of
an arbitrator in event of fraud or mistake so gross as to imply bad faith; and of course
the same rule applies in favor of the public body when the acts of the arbitrator establish fraud." From this summary it is not difficult to see that court practice is neither
oriented to well-established basic rules nor free from inconsistencies.
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be at least of Utah origin; only where the materials were not procurable
in Utah could they be selected freely by the contractors. A second
clause placed the contractors under obligation to do all excavating, loading, and back filling with hand labor; they were allowed to use teams
and tractors only for plowing and loosening the materials to be removed. Thirdly, the contractors undertook to rotate all common labor
and, so far as possible, all other labor once each week; the same workmen were not to be employed by them for more than two weeks in any
month, and no worker was to be employed by them who during the
month had had two weeks of work in any kind of employment, as long
as other unemployed should be available. To facilitate the handling
of the labor supply, the board of commissioners, on its part, agreed to
set up a labor registration agency to list all those presenting themselves
as able-bodied citizens of the United States and bona fide residents of
Salt Lake City for the past year. Under a fourth stipulation preference in employment was to be given by the contractors to citizens
of the United States or those having declared their intention to acquire
citizenship, and particularly to residents of Salt Lake City, especially
heads of families. Finally, the contractors were obligated to employ
workers no more than eight hours a day, and to pay a minimum wage
of $3.50 per day.

The chief purpose of these special clauses was to create employment. Naturally, the board of commissioners was not unaware of the
inevitable increase in construction costs. The increase altogether
amounted to about $55,000, while the total construction costs ran to
some $6oo,ooo. An earlier special bond election had authorized the
city to secure this sum through a bond issue. The additional outlay,
alleged to be "illegal and wasteful", gave rise to a taxpayer's suit aiming
at a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent the municipality from
consummating the contracts. The Supreme Court of Utah granted
the writ. 9 Of the five members of the court, two joined in a dissenting
opinion, one of them being the chief justice. Each of the other three
justices offered separate reasons.
The first of these three,' 0 while affirming the statutory power of
the municipality "to construct . . . sewers, and to regulate the construction . . . thereof","' took issue with the special clauses imposed.

He denied the city's authority to make the work of constructing the
sewers subject to a condition which in no wise enhances the value or
the merit of the sewers, but is inspired solely by a purpose of alleviating
9. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P. (2d) 591 (1932), 8o U.
REv. 1167. See Tooke, Judicial Decisions (1932) 21 NAT. MUN. RM'. 326
1o. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 122, 8 P. (2d) 591 (1932).
iI. UTAH Comrp. LAWS (1917) § 570x37.
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in part the unemployment situation, a wholly collateral condition to the
objects and purposes sought by the construction of the storm sewers.
According to him, in exercising the statutory power authorizing the
city to provide a system of storm sewers, the board of commissioners,
by insisting upon the labor stipulations, had been carried "far beyond
the orbit of the power it is ostensibly asserting. Its action in this respect
is wholly without authority and therefore illegal." 12 As to the additional cost resulting from the labor stipulations, the spokesman for the
court had "no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that there is a plain
diversion to the extent of $55,ooo from a fund specifically created by
the sale of bonds for the purpose of constructing a system of storm
sewers .... ,"13 Use of this sum to finance what was virtually a reemployment measure "cannot meet the sanction of the law".
Nor did the minimum wage clause prove acceptable to the court.
Counsel for the municipality had placed reliance on two leading cases
from other jurisdictions. 1 4 These cases were declared "not at all apposite", since they had arisen in jurisdictions "where the charter powers
of municipalities are far more comprehensive than is the case in this
state". Conceding the argument that the city, had it decided to do the
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 128, 8 P. (2d) 591, 594 (1932).
13. Id. at 129, 8 P. (2d) at 594.
14. The two cases were Malette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496 (1913),
and Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N. W. 81g (1916). In the first mentioned
case, a municipal ordinance providing for the eight hour day on public works was sustained against the contention that it conflicted with the public policy of the state and
represented abuse of discretion. The court pointed to the State Constitution, art. ii,
§ io, which conferred upon cities of the first class "the largest measure of local selfgovernment compatible with the general authority of the 9tate". M'Ialette case, at 224,
137 Pac. at 505. The charter placed no restriction on the city's power to contract for
public improvements, except in connection with the procurement of supplies where it
provided that the lowest bid be accepted. Further, a state law had established the
eight hour day for state and local public works. Denying the relief asked for by a
property owner, the court declared: "So long as the council acted in good faith, a general law or general ordinance not unreasonably increasing the cost of the work, would
not invalidate the assessment." Id. at 230, 137 Pac. at 5o8. In the other case, a contractor had been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance limiting the working hours
on public works. The ordinance was attacked as conflicting with the city charter; and
as an unreasonable exercise of regulatory power if the charter authorized a regulation
of working hours. Under a state statute, Milwaukee was empowered to regulate and
administer its local affairs. Another statute provided for the eight hour day in all
public works undertaken by the state. The charter required that all public contracts be
let to the lowest bidder. No conflict between the ordinance and this charter provision
was found by the court, which held that "When the specifications are complete, including the prescribed limitation as to the hours of labor for men to be employed upon public work, all bidders are on the same footing, and the one bidding the lowest sum is
the lowest bidder within the meaning of the charter". Raulf case, at 186, 159 N. W. at
827. Power to enact the ordinance, on the other hand, was deemed inherent in the general welfare provision of the charter. Nor did the court see ground for declaring the
ordinance unreasonable, since it appeared that similar provisions applied to public works
carried on under federal and state laws. If the results of the ordinance were in any way
mischievous, "the remedy rests with the people themselves. The remedy is legislative
and political and is not to be found in the judicial field. The field of legislative discretion is broad, and as long as legislative bodies stay within its limits their enactments
are the law of the land". Id. at i89, 159 N. W. at 828. The arrest and conviction were
upheld.
12.
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work without letting it out,1 could have established the same minimum
wage without hindrance, the court nevertheless refused to consider it
"a true analogy to assume that it [the city] has the like right to dictate
to its contractors the wages they must pay their workmen".
What of the employment preference to be given heads of families
in Salt Lake City? Under the laws of Utah, 16 such preference, on all
public works, must be accorded "citizens of the United States, or those
having declared their intention of becoming citizens. In each contract
for the construction of public works the provisions shall be inserted
to the effect that if the provisions of this section are not complied with
the contract shall be void." In granting preference to family breadwinners in Salt Lake City, the board of commissioners, in the words of
the court, "imposed a preference not embraced nor included in the
statutes, and contrary to the statute restricted and limited the prefer-

ence to heads of families of Salt Lake City. The city was, as we are,
bound by the statute and by the policy so declared by the state, and
which may not lawfully be enlarged or restricted. This provision of
the contract cannot be sustained."' 1
Both of the concurring opinions are considerably more elaborate.
The next justice to raise his voice 's prefaced his reasoning with a survey of the background of the contested contracts. Persuading himself
that "we judicially may notice the existence of the depression", he
stressed three points: that during the bond election campaign there had
been public reference to the reemployment opportunities afforded by the
construction project; that, moreover, without the unemployment situation the work would not have been approved at the time; but that on
the other hand the public had never been forewarned of any intention
to carry out the project "on any basis other than an economical and
practical cost". Quite apart from these facts, however, the justice, in
construing its regulatory power over municipal works, denied the city
any discretion concerning the imposition of the stipulations assailed
in the suit. 9
15. Since the improvement was not "to be paid for out of the general funds of said
city", the board of commissioners was in this case not required to solicit bids or to let
contracts. UTAH ComP. LAWS (1917) § 8ig, as amended by Utah Laws 1919, c. r4. Cf.
Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 (1929).
i6. UTAH COMP. LAWS (917) § 4865.
17. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 132, 8 P. (2d) 591, 595 (932).
i8. Id. at 132, 8 P. (2d) at 595.
19. As stated by Straup, J.: "It may readily be conceded that the commission

[board of commissioners] had a sound discretion in estimating or approving estimates
of the cost of the proposed and contemplated works, as to the kind and quality of material to be used, the manner in which the works were to be constructed and the character and workmanship thereof, the making and specifying of plans and specifications,
accepting or rejecting bids for the proposed works and in respect of other particulars
relating thereto; and that the exercise of such a discretion may not be judiciallly interfered with except upon allegations and proof of fraud or bad faith, arbitrariness, caprice,
or abuse. Of course, where there is no power or authority
good faith is involved." Id. at 134, 8 P. (2d) at 596.

•

.,

no discretion or

COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Could it be assumed that such discretion might be found within the
broadest grant of municipal power, the "general welfare clause"? This
statutory clause 20 confers upon the board of commissioners, among
others, the power "to appropriate money for corporate purposes only,
and provide for payment of debts and expenses of the corporation; and
to purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, and dispose of property,
real and personal, for the benefit of the city, both within and without
its corporate boundaries; to improve and protect such property, and
to do all other things in relation thereto as natural persons; provided,
that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose to appropriate money for
any purpose which, in the judgment of the board of commissioners or
city council, will provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote
the prosperity, and improve the morals, peace, order, comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of such city". 21 The justice disarmed
this clause in the instant case by limiting its scope to measures financed
out of the city's general fund. 2 2 The bonds in question "were duly
authorized to construct the municipal improvement, and . . . were
issued and negotiated stripped of the objectionable features complained
of". Hence, he concluded, these moneys could not legitimately be
diverted to such ends as were sought to be gained by the contractual
stipulations under scrutiny.
Furthermore, since under the laws of Utah relief of the destitute
was the concern of the counties, 23 not the cities and towns, the concurring opinion even questioned the public character of the additional
expense envisaged by the stipulations. Are not the beneficiaries of the
intended reemployment measures a "class"?

Indeed, " . . . the city,

by imposing and requiring the performance of the complained of provisions in contracts let and to be let for the construction of the improvements, applied and will apply a substantial portion of the proceeds of
the bonds to an object and a purpose which is not the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure, but, in a claimed advancement of public welfare, to a purpose admittedly to promote private
interests of individuals out of employment, and by such provisions requiring the employment of a larger number of men than is necessary
to construct the improvements, which essentially constitutes an applica20. UTAH Comp. LAWS (1917) § 570x2.

21. Italics added.
22. In his words, "Though it be assumed, which is not even contended for by the
city, that, because of such general welfare clause, the city would be authorized or justified in its discretion to make appropriations out of its general fund for such a purpose,
yet no one should so far be carried away by emotions or sentiment as to urge that the
city would be authorized or justified in making such appropriations directly or indirectly out of a special fund not created for such a purpose". Bohn v. Salt Lake City,
79 Utah 121, 144, 8 P. (2d) 59o, 6oo (1932).
23. UTAH ComP. LAWS (1917) § 1400x40.
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tion of a substantial portion of such proceeds to a private and not a public object

.

24

It is well to remind ourselves that this was nearly

five years before the Social Security Cases.2 5
More specifically, the concurring opinion held the city without
power to establish by municipal action the eight hour day and to set
a minimum wage on local projects: the' former, because the eight hour
day rested in Utah on statute, 2 6 the latter, because no corresponding
authority was conferred upon the city by statute. The scheme of em27
ployment preferences was considered invalid on parallel grounds.
In short, and with much benevolent emphasis : 28 "Laudable and proper
enough it is for the city, because of unemployment conditions, to now
construct the needed improvements, yet in the construction of them,
to meet an emergency which has not a thing to do with . . .the construction and use of the improvements themselves . . . the city may

not transcend its powers and do what admittedly it could not legiti29
mately do without such emergency" .
The second concurring opinion 30 adds little to the arguments set
forth thus far. It is strongest in general doctrine.3 1 Our justice, for
instance, saw in the hand labor clause ".

.

. a departure from the trend

of modern civilization".3 2 Is it surprising that he placed the spending
of money for reemployment purposes on a par with a charity dona24. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, I43, 8 F. (2d) 590, 599 (1932).
25. See particularly Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 586-587 (1937).
26. UTAH COMP. LAWS (1917)

§ 3666.

27. "The city may not nor may we enlarge and expand or restrict the statute to
suit emergencies or conditions or particular cases not embraced within the statute. . .
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 2I, i55, 8 P. (2d) 59o, 604 (1932).
28. "There are so-called 'cracker-barrel philosophers' who, by their pseudo-philosophies, contend that the more difficult it is made to do a thing the better it is for those
who have to sell labor, denounce the machine age and mass production, insist that
modem labor-saving machinery diminish employment and enslave the many to make
captains of a few, and to a large extent the use of them should be restricted or prevented, that mankind would be better off by causing work to be less productive and by
requiring additional labor to accomplish the same thing, or by getting as little done as
possible, all of which Professor Taussig in his treatise on Principlesof Economics . . .
has shown to be spurious.... ".Id. at i5o, 8 P. (2d) at 602. And again, it must
. . . be noticed and not minimized nor lightly pushed aside that the primary and
more important duty imposed upon the board and the city in spending taxpayers' moneys
intrusted to them for a special and particular purpose was to so expend the fund as
best to accomplish an efficient and proper construction of the improvement at an economical, reasonable, and practical cost and for the benefit of the taxpayers and the general
public. The board was required to be as solicitous to promote and safeguard the interests of the general public and of the taxpayers as to promote interests of and give aid
and benefit to a particular class". Id. at I54, 8 P. (2d) at 6o3.
29. Id. at 157, 8 P. (2d) at 605.
30. Id. at i58, 8 P. (2d) at 6o5.
3r. "Independent of statute, the city commissioners as trustees of the bond money
are required to see that it is honestly, prudently, and economically expended for the
construction of the storm sewer and for no other purpose." Id. at 164, 8 P. (2d) at 607.
And still more intriguing: "Prosperity bought upon credit must eventually in the end
force many of those who now own their own homes or their own business to give them
up and at the same time deter others from buying homes or setting up in business".
Ibid.
32. Id. at 159, 8 P. (2d) at 605.
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tion? 33 The tenor of his thought revolved around a petitio principii,
to wit: "Our law does not recognize good faith or a lofty purpose as a
legal excuse for diverting a special fund or any part thereof to a purpose other than that contemplated in the creation of such a fund. Exigencies do not change the rule. Nor is the rule relaxed by the pretense
of keeping within it. The law looks to the substance, not to the
form". 3 4 The conclusion reached is implicit in the premise.
As contrasted with the views recorded for the court, the dissenting
opinion, 3 5 underwritten by the chief justice without comment of his
own, displays greater compactness and consistency. We need not go
into the review of leading decisions which it cites in its support, since
none of them is directly applicable to the facts of our case. Suffice it
to present the essential structure of argumentation from its opening
passages: "The city has by delegation from the state plenary power to
construct, maintain, and repair sewers. No limitations have been
placed upon this power by the state . . . The possession of the power
to do the work being conceded, a generous measure of its exercise will
be permitted to the end that it may effectuate its purpose, and courts
will not interfere except to see that the board has acted within the scope
of its delegated power; that its discretion has not been abused; and that
it was not actuated by fraud or bad faith. In its capacity as owner
and proprietor the city is not hampered, where there are no statutory
or constitutional restrictions, as to the manner or means to be employed
in the construction of its public works. The conditions which an employer municipality may impose as to the manner of doing its work
involves questions of policy which are within the discretion of the board
of commissioners to decide. With respect to questions of policy the
courts have nothing to do. The increased cost of the improvement is
not of such magnitude as to imply fraud or bad faith. On this question the courts may inquire into the reasons and circumstances which
actuated or explain the conduct of the board. When the reasons are
considered, they show that the board is motivated by considerations of
public welfare." 36
33. "So far as the plaintiff taxpayer is concerned, if he has no valid objection to
the construction of the storm sewer under the proposed plan, I am unable to see how he
could be heard to complain if the city were to construct the sewer in the usual way and
then apply the money thus saved to some charitable or other purpose. In either event
the property taxpayer will receive the same benefits and will be required to pay the
same amount of taxes towards the satisfaction of the principal and the interest upon the
bonds." Id. at 165, 8 P. (2d) at 6o7.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at I66. 8 P. (2d) at 6o8.
36. As the closing part of the dissenting opinion aptly formulates it: "While the
storm sewers which the city contemplates building are, and have been for many years,
a necessity and will serve a useful and convenient purpose, nevertheless the board of
commissioners determined to cause such public improvements to be constructed during
this winter for the express purpose of relieving the unprecedented condition of unem-
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Turning from apologia to praise, the dissenting opinion underscored the beneficial motivation of the city fathers' course: "All such
questions are questions of public policy which are for the city authorities to decide, and, unless they exceed their powers or abuse their discretion, the court will not substitute its judgment for theirs. This
would be true even if we did not know the reasons which actuated the
board in making the proposed contracts. With that information before
us, we can say that, not only were the motives of the board of commissioners not bad, but were wholly good, and its action was taken
for the avowed purpose of ministering to the general welfare of the
community, and for this the board is to be commended and not condemned."

37

The decision has not been received with acclaim 3 8 in all quarters. 39
There are many minor aspects to the case on which opinions may differ.
At this point, we shall confine ourselves to a delineation of the principal
issue. The principal issue is not suggested by the remark of the second
concurring opinion to the effect that "this court is committed to the
ployment now prevailing. It thereupon submitted its propsal to the people who voted
the bonds for the purpose of constructing such storm sewers. The citizens were well
advised, not by the specific terms of the proposal submitted to them for vote, but by declarations publicly made by the mayor and the board of commissioners and other public
spirited citizens who were interested in providing employment for unemployed workmen in this locality, that, if the bonds were issued, the work would be speedily undertaken and diligently prosecuted, and that conditions would be written into the contracts
providing for the use of the maximum number of laborers that could be well used on
the enterprise. I do not pretend to say that the requirement of hand labor instead of
machinery in the excavation and back filling for the sewers is ordinarily an economical
or social policy. That is for the board of commissioners to say in the light of the conditions now existing. Society must solve the problems which arise from the use of
modem machinery and efficient methods of production, not by discarding such instrumentalities, but by making use of them for the benefit of all. In view of the present
emergency, the requirements for rotation of labor and that certain work be done by
manual labor were prescribed in the exercise of a sound discretion. In view of this
situation, we cannot say that the board abused its discretion, or that its action was
arbitrary or capricious in any respect whatsoever. There is nothing in the record
which points to bad faith or fraud. On the other hand, the action of the city authorities was well considered and under the circumstances wisely conceived. In such times
as these, municipal authorities may well be subject to criticism and condemnation if
they fail to move in the direction of doing all that lies in their power to meet the crisis
of unemployment and as best they can alleviate the suffering of the people, not by
charity or doles which is beyond their power, but by means of providing work on public improvements. The people do not want charity but do desire to support themselves
and their families by honest labor. It would be an indictment of our civilization if public officers under such circumstances have no means of meeting the situation and particularly where, as here, the city authorities have proceeded only within the powers granted
them by the Legislature and are not violating any law enacted to place a limit upon
their powers." Id. at 187, 8 P. (2d) at 616.
37. Id. at 185, 8 P. (2d) at 616.
38. "In the instant case the municipal authorities overlooked two elementary principles: that all their powers must find a statutory warrant and that it is not their
province but that of the legislative authority of the state to enlarge them by its declaration of public policy. An enabling statute or a validating act by the state legislature
conferring the powers sought to be exercised would undoubtedly be sustained by the
courts." Tooke, supra note 9, at 327.
39. It was declared erroneous and deplored as another far-reaching intrusion into
municipal autonomy in (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. Ray. 1167.
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doctrine that a municipality has only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by an act of the Legislature, and such powers as are
necessary to the exercise of the powers expressly conferred". 40 For
wide powers indeed were found to be delegated to the municipality in
question. It is true the sedes materiae is not the statutory provision
concerning the "regulation" of municipal construction. 41 The relevant
authorization must rather be looked for in the "general welfare
clause". 42 The canon of strict interpretation is relaxed when it comes
to the manner in which a municipality carries into effect powers expressly and clearly granted. 43 Nor does the cardinal issue reside in the
'class" character of the reemployment measures. In this matter, the
practical experience of recent years has wrought striking changes, as
attested by Mr. Justice Cardozo's reflection that it is in our day "too
late . . . for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis
so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed
and their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general welfare". 44 No room is left for valid doubts.
It should be equally patent that the central issue does not arise
from the nature of the municipal fund relied upon for financing the
sewer construction. The actual diversion of special funds can be challenged on more than one ground. It is not a diversion in the proper
sense, however, if a municipality, in devoting the special fund to its
purpose, makes contractual dispositions to effect the giving of weight
to broader municipal interests. The source of the revenue does not
entitle the municipality to dispense with general considerations of public
interest. Even if it operates with a special fund, the municipal administration is not only authorized but also obligated to incorporate into
its public contracts all such clauses as safeguard and promote legitimate
municipal concerns and the common interests of its citizenry. 45 The
"general welfare clause" 46 cannot be conceived of as applicable to
municipal transactions that bear a relationship with the general fund,
and as inapplicable to the execution of those projects which are financed
out of a special fund. Within the wide categories of municipal activity
40. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, i6o, 8 P. (2d) 591, 605 (932).
41. See supra p. 428.
42. See supra p. 431.
43. "The rule of strict construction does not apply to the ,node adopted by the municipality to carry into effect Powers expressly or plainly granted, where the mode is
not limited or prescribed by the legislature, and is left to the discretion of the municipal
authorities. In such a case the usual test of validity of the act of a municipal body is,
Whether it is reasonable? and there is no presumption against the municipal action in
such cases." I DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 239. (Italics are
Dillon's.)
44. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 586 (1937).
45. "Public bodies have the right and the duty to insert in public contracts such
reasonable stipulations as will tend to serve and protect the public interests.
DONNELLY, op. cit supra note 5, § 151.
46. See supra p. 431.
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embraced by it, the "general welfare clause" permeates all transactions,
irrespective of the source of revenue.
47
The principal issue actually lies below the surface of our case.
It involves a problem of differentiation. It may be presented in these
questions: Did the board of commissioners, in writing the controversial
clauses into the contracts, operate within the bounds of lawful discretion, although conceivably subject to errorsin judgment. Or was the
board responding to motives clearly outside the area encompassed by the
"general welfare clause"? The opinions advanced for the court and
the impressive dissent alike invite the conclusion that each of the justices
aimed in the direction of this differentiaton. Yet the problem was not
sharply defined, and the judicial logic stumbled more than once over the
futile effort to equate the above differentiation with that between reasonable and unreasonable conduct. To the inadequacy of such an
equation we shall revert in the closing part of our discussion.

II
Are there leading considerations to be derived for the solution of
the major problem from foreign jurisdictions? The legal situation
posed in the Utah case 48 is not without a counterpart in French administrative and municipal law. A prefatory note, however, is in order.
Municipal administration in France is traditionally overshadowed by
the coordinating and supervisory power of the central authority. 49 The
French system of local government is heavily weighted toward the
national interest. Thus municipal authorities must fit their initiative
more cautiously into the program of the government than would be in
harmony with American standards and practice. One may say that a
47. The governmental and administrative objectives of competitive bidding do not

collide with the motives that went into the framing of the contractual clauses assailed
in the suit. The principle of competive bidding admits of a combination with municipal
policies aiming at factors outside the municipality's interest in the improvement itself,
in so far as these policies are as such in accordance with the law. It is a somewhat
forced argument when the first concurring opinion presents it as ". . . conceivable,

because of such and of other complained of provisions, that some responsible bidders
would even decline to bid or enter into contracts to do the work under such conditions
and restrictions imposed and required". Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, i5I, i6o
P. (2d) 591, 6o2 (1932).

In our case, moreover, competitive bidding and the letting of

contracts was not legally required. See supra p. 430.
48. See supra p. 426 et seq.
49. "The evolution of French local government institutions contrasts sharply with
the story of 'local self-government' in Anglo-Saxon countries. Modern France is a
unitary state with deeply rooted traditions of governmental centralization. These traditions have their origins in a thousand years of absolute monarchy and empire. Despite
the democratic impact of the Great Revolution of 1789 upon the political development
of the country, the substructure of centralized administration remained unbroken. Far
from considering the advisability of 'federalizing' the governmental system, the Revolutionary Assemblies endeavored to obliterate such remnants of regional autonomy as
were left in the 'hated' Ancien R~gime. Since the primary impetus for the Revolution
came from the populace of Paris and other large cities, the leaders of 'the Third Estate'
were determined to destroy the historical particularism of those provinces which they
felt might be prejudicial to the success of the new France." See Sharp, France. in
ANzDERSo, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE (1939) 109.
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true self-government has failed to materialize even under the Third
Republic. The Municipal Code of 1 884 0 embodies the principle of
enumerated powers rather than that of broad authorization to foster the
general welfare of the local citizenry. The incidence of central supervision is extensive,"1 although more recently the former conception of
specific approval of municipal measures has tended to give way to the
idea of a supervisory veto.52 These fundamental differences should be
kept in mind in the discussion of the French case now to engage our
attention, the Caillette case.
In its meetings of July 3, i886, and April 27, 1887, the municipal
council of Paris adopted a set of conditions to be inserted into all contracts subsequently let by it for the construction of public works. One
of the conditions provided that a uniform wage be paid for each occupational category of workers employed. Another stipulation limited
the hours of work to nine each day, with a day off every week. The
government, in the exercise of its supervisory power, requested for its
guidance an opinion of the Conseil d'Atat. The latter declared the
conditions to be in conflict with the nature and in restraint of competitive bidding. Armed with this advice, the government annulled the
council vote.
In a later meeting held May 2, i888, the municipal council substituted for the original uniform wage a minimum wage binding upon all
bidders. The council retained the nine hour stipulation,5" 3 although now
limiting its application to one single group of workers. While the
modifications did not touch the basic economic consideration, the government nevertheless acquiesced in the face of the council's conciliatory
gesture, and refrained from pursuing another annulment. Consequently, a number of contracts were let on the basis of competitive bids
5o. A very competent translation of the major parts of the French Municipal Code
of 1884 can be found id. at 202 et seq.
51. "While the range of matters upon which the council may independently act has
gradually been widened during the last half century, they are still unimpressive in com-

parison with the functions freely exercised by the councils of American cities. The
municipal code lists twelve important types of action which require the approval of
some superior authority before they can become effective. These functions fall into
four major groups: (i) the purchase, mortgaging, selling, or leasing of municipal property; (2) the appropriation of money, the fixing of tax rates, the borrowing of money,
and the granting of concessions; (3) the establishment, naming, alteration, and closing
of municipal streets, squares, parks, and gardens; and (4) the intervention of the commune in the domain of public utility enterprises, whether by direct operation or subsidy to private concerns, including, as types of activity, the supply of food, housing, welfare, or health services, or urban beautification. In the aggregate these functions
constitute the very heart and substance of municipal activity." Id. at 144-145.
52. "Until 1926 specific approval was necessary in every instance. The reform
legislation of that year, however, authorized 'tacit' approval in the following sense: if
the prefect (or subprefect) does not indicate his disapproval within forty days after
the council has voted, the measure shall be considered as having been approved. Similarly, where control by a national authority is provided, no action within three months
is equivalent to approval." Id. at 145.
53. Including the provision concerning a free day every week.
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submitted in compliance with the special clauses. 5 4 The awards found
the formal approval of the Prefect of the Seine, as the agent of the
central authority.
One of the contractors, while actually submitting the lowest bid,
had raised reservations against the wage and hour stipulations, which
he protested as illegal. As a result, he was eliminated from the competition by the municipal agency in charge of competitive bidding. In his
recourse before the Conseil d'F6tat he sought the annulment of the
awards. The recourse prevailed. 5 In its decision, the Conseil d'.tat
had no reason to express itself on the general question of labor stipulations inserted into contracts awarded in consequence of competitive
bidding for public works. The commissaire du gouvernement, in his
presentation to the Conseil d'Atat, referred in this respect to the "oldest
and most venerable" ministerial contract form for public works, the
General Conditions for Bridge and Road Construction of November
16, 1866. He stressed the validity of the General Conditions and of
those of its special clauses which imposed upon the enterpreneurs
specific obligations as to the monthly payment of wages, the accumulation of an industrial accident and sickness fund, and the cessation of
work on Sunday. He cited similar provisions from the contract form
adopted by the War and Navy Ministries.
Nor did he doubt, generally speaking, the legality of similar clauses
in municipal contracts, even of stipulations limiting, in view of serious
economic conditions, the labor force to be employed by the contractor
to workers living in the community.5 6 Still, as a matter of principle,
he insisted that no municipality, in carrying out public works, "may
impose on an entrepreneur the same obligations which a private individual having work done at his expense might stipulate. . . ." 57 The
commissairehad little difficulty in making plain the legal considerations
supporting the distinction. The individual, he pointed out, deals only
with his private property. Municipal councils, on the other hand,
administer public funds and thus dispose of the local taxpayers' money.
With respect to the funds entrusted to it, no council may claim the same
rights and the same freedom of disposal that is inherent in private
property. Stipulations financially burdensome to the contractors would
necessarily raise the cost of public works. The inference drawn by the
54. The stipulations were detailed to the point of providing a minimum wage also
for piecework and overwork, and restricting the number of foreign workers. Each case
of non-compliance was subject to a fine of IO francs, quite apart from contractual consequences.

55. Conseil d't*tat, March

21,

i89o, Dalloz Jurisprudence, i89i III. 8i.

56. He mentioned specifically this very case, and also restrictions applying to the
employment of alien labor, such as were imposed by the municipal council in the controversial contracts. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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commissaire was that such stipulations, viewed by themselves, must
consequently be regarded as prohibited. Moreover, all public works to
be undertaken by local authorities are subject to special administrative
regulation 58 and administrative control, from which the cities are not
at liberty to depart. In contrast with these far-reaching qualifications
of municipal determination, individuals are entitled to follow their own
private judgment.
From his analysis of the contractual stipulations imposed by the
municipal council, the commissaire carried away the impression that
the council "had in a certain way attempted to do the work of the
legislator", 59 trying to regulate labor conditions in a manner comparable
with the women and child labor legislation. In the first council deliberations concerning the issue, one member, justifying the measure as the
official rapporteur,had indeed summarized the municipal motivation as
follows: "The worker lives from day to day, lacking all credit; he finds
himself confronted with an employer who has capital and credit, and
who imposes his conditions upon the worker. It is hence required to
protect the worker against the greater strength of the employer. Why
in England does the government not intervene in these questions? It
is because in that country there exists a workers' organization as strong
as that of the employers, the trade unions. The same force, counterbalancing the power of capital, is lacking in France. Therein lies the
siguificance of the intervention on the part of the city of Paris as far
as its public works are concerned, and that of the government in the
area of its own public works. The city of Paris represents the balancing
power which the workers do not possess in their struggle against the
employers." 60 Such policy touching matters of state, however, lies,
in the eyes of the commissaire, distinctly outside the municipal sphere.
What is even more important: the French Parliament, conscious
of the political orientation of the municipal council, had placed specific
legislative restraints upon the latter's discretion relative to the contested
contractual clauses. The national legislature, aware of the political
intentions controlling the deliberations of the council, managed to counteract these tendencies in connection with a statutory authorization,
addressed to the city of Paris, to employ municipal credit for public
works. The credit act of December 3, 1888, a gift horse handsomely
groomed, contained an express provision 61 to the effect that the wage
and hour stipulations in the city's contract form should be treated as
without legal effect.
58. Especially the ordinance of November 14, 1837, which prescribes in its art. i
competitive bidding for all municipal public works. See J~ze, Thiorie Gjn~rale dcs
Contratsde l'Administration (93o) 47 REV. DU DROIT PUBLIC 268.

59. Conseil d'Etat, March 21, i89o, Dalloz Jurisprudence, i8gi III. 81.
6o. As quoted by the commissaire, ibid.
6i. Art. 2.
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On the particular question of the minimum wage, the commissaire
saw no alternative for the Conseil d'Atat to adhering without qualification to the tenor of its earlier opinion submitted to the government in
1888.6" He considered the municipal wage policy a clear violation of
the ordinance of November 14, 1837,63 arguing that the public bidding
procedure made obligatory by the ordinance for all public works undertaken by local authorities would be jeopardized by the disputed minimum wage clause. The municipal measure would inevitably lead to a
restriction of competitive bidding, deprive thereby the procedure of its
key feature, and make price concessions of the contractors entirely
illusory. He could not persuade himself that the substitution of a
minimum wage for a uniform wage really changed the legal situation.
To him, the cardinal factor was the interference of a municipal body
with the determination of the worker's wage, a determination which, as
he put it with disarming naivet6, must be "considered freely between
employer and laborer". 6 4 Any municipal intervention would conflict
with "the fundamental principles of freedom of bargaining and freedom of work". 65
The commissaire admitted that the nine hour clause posed a problem "much more delicate". 66 He pointed out himself that the limitation
of workinghours was "the order of the day in all countries" 7 Nevertheless, the problem, in his words, was one arising "in the legislative
rather than in the municipal domain". 68 At any rate, the municipal
council could not, without exceeding its power, link the nine hour clause
inseparably with the untenable minimum wage stipulation. A severance
of these two, on the other hand, would not have saved the clause. For,
in the mind of the commissaire, the clause, in its practical effects,
appeared as irreconcilable with the guiding idea underlying competitive
bidding as did the minimum wage stipulation. The limitation of working hours, as he observed somewhat vaguely, would "merely cause a
prolongation of the execution of the public works". 6 9 Yet with all that
to be said about the substantive side of the case, he was not inclined to
urge redress in judicial forms. In his opinion, the matter belonged in
the legislative realm. "The government could annul the illegal deliberations of the municipal council; the legislative power could intervene
62. See supra p. 437.
63. See supra p. 439.
64. Conseil d'tat,March 21, i8go, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1891 III. 81, 82.
65. Ibid. Both the formulation and the philosophy behind it seem to anticipate the
classical reasoning enunciated in Lochner v. New York, z98 U. S. 45 (9o5).
66. Conseil d'Etat, March 21, i89o, Dalloz Jurisprudence, i89i III. 8I, 82.
67. Ibid. He referred.to the statutory regulation in the interest of miners in England and Germany and cited the emphasis placed upon the question by "all economists".
Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
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as the last resort. Besides such intervention of the government and the
Parliament, however, we see no room for a settlement by judicial procedure." 70
In spite of this recommendation to abstain from assuming jurisdiction, the Conseil d'.itat accepted the recourse of the aggrieved contractor. As to the substantive issue, the decision emphasized the close
relationship between the council vote of May 2, 1888,7 1 and the earlier
deliberations annulled by the government for valid reasons, both as an
72
encroachment upon the legally safeguarded freedom of labor contract
and as a transgression of the boundaries of municipal power. In other
words, the Conseil d'Atat, quite naturally, stayed on the same side of the
fence that it had chosen in its previous opinion submitted at the request
of the government. 73 In addition to general doctrine, the Conseil d'Atat
deduced the illegality of the controversial stipulations from the Act of
December 3, 1888, which explicitly pronounced the entire contract provision "reputge non gcrite".74 Thus fortified by a double-track reasoning, the conclusion seemed to become impregnable: that the city council,
by inserting the wage and hour stipulations into its contracts, had
exceeded its lawful powers. If plaintiff refused to submit to the stipulations, this fact alone provided no legal motive for his elimination from
the competition.
In comparing the French case with the Utah case, we must bear in
mind, as submitted earlier, 75 that the institutions of local government
in France operate within a statutory authorization considerably narrower than is customary even among those of our cities not enjoying
home rule in the technical sense. In the French Municipal Code, 76 one

does not find a parallel to the "general welfare clause" 77 which Salt
Lake City invoked to justify its course of action. Hence the argument
to be derived from the Caillette case is that from the minus to the majus.
The broader lesson of the French case is, as we shall demonstrate, by no
means wholly negative. Its positive doctrine, on the other hand, is of
double significance for such jurisdictions as reflect the idea of local
self-government in a fuller sense. An index is supplied in this respect
by the very presence of the "general welfare clause".
7o. Ibid.
7i. See supra p. 437.
72. Acts of October 7/14, 179o, and May 24, 1872.

The first mentioned act goes

back to the "right of work" proclaimed in the Diclaration des droits de l'homme of
1789.
73. See supra p. 437.
74. Art. 2.
75. See supra P. 436.
76. See supra p. 437.
77. See supra p. 431.
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Both with regard to the elimination of a contractor from the competition 71 and with regard to special stipulations in general, there is no
controversy among the French authorities as to the discretionary basis
of the decision, irrespective of the public body making the decision.
Nor is it a matter of conjecture that each public body, in the exercise of
its discretion, must comply with the general principles governing administrative acts.7 9 As the commissaire du gouvernement correctly pointed
out in the Caillette case,8 0 no public authority, in framing its contract
forms, enjoys the same freedom that is properly the private individual's.
Every single contractual stipulation must rest on authorization, an
authorization that may be specific or general. Each stipulation must
therefore be supported by a legitimate public motive, more precisely, a
public motive the pursuit of which falls into the sphere of activity
assigned by law to the public authority in question.8 1 The Conseil
d'Atat inquires into such motivation as a question of law.
In the Caillette case, the decisive problem is the question of the
extent of the sphere of municipal power. As a matter of policy the
municipal council of Paris, unlike the board of commissioners of Salt
Lake City, did not aim at conditions of local import; its controlling
thought was not to secure social benefits for the population of Paris.
Essentially, it intended to prod the government into passing labor
legislation. Unquestionably, the city council's method of doing so
by the assertion of municipal power over its contractors was inappropriate. Reliance on municipal power for this purpose carried the council beyond its proper municipal concerns. Moreover, as was made
obvious to the council by the annulment of its earlier enactment and by
the special law subsequently passed by the national legislature, 2 the
latter as well as the government were unwilling to respond to the hint
coming from the municipal chamber. In fact, both had indicated concretely that there was, at least for the time being, a clear collision of
national and municipal policy. This element too is missing from the
Utah case.
In the absence of a municipal concern, the assertion of municipal
power did not present itself as a legitimate qualification of the statutory
principle of "freedom of bargaining and freedom of work". In France,
as with us, civil rights are not construed as absolute; any restriction,
however, as a qualification of the exercise of the right, must have a
78. See J6ze, supra note 58, at 316-317. See also id. at 261, 265.
79. See 3 JtzE, op. cit. suPra note 5, at 223; Riesenfeld, The French System of Adiniistrative Justice: A Model for America? (1938) 18 B. U. L. REV. 400; Morstein
Marx, supra note 3, at 974.
8o. See supra p. 438.
81. See Morstein Marx, supra note 3, at 976.
82. See supra p. 439.
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foundation in lawful public concerns.

In our case, such a foundation

was lacking. This, of course, says little about the validity of contractual stipulations in general,83 and of labor stipulations in particular.
Still, the law is not ambiguous on this point. The commissaire summarized it without error: municipalities are not barred from safeguarding their lawful interests in the framing of special clauses. He
himself suggested as an example contractual provisions requiring the
employment of local labor in order to alleviate the impact of economic
adversity upon the municipality. 4 No such conditions confronted the
municipal council of Paris; they did confront the board of commissioners of Salt Lake City.
By advancing this example, however, the commissaire introduced
a far-reaching modification into his cost argument. Certainly, for outof-town contractors to be limited to local labor would mean, as a rule,
the necessity of higher bids. The logic of the illustration, in other
words, is this: the cost factor represents a general barrier to labor
stipulations, unless it is balanced by a municipal interest as substantial
as that of economical management of public funds. After all, there are
obvious future savings involved in many a municipal expenditure. It
requires therefore no elaboration that the cost factor can be relied upon
as a standard of prohibition only when and where the cost increase is
not sustained with reference to any objectives properly pursued by a
municipal body. Public authorities do not exist merely for the sake of
fiscal thrift. What they accomplish is rather the fruit of constructive
spending.
Let us also remind ourselves that the date of the Caillette case is
I89O, and that since then the problem of adequate labor standards has
acquired a vastly different complexion, here and abroad.8 5 The same
general movement of public opinion has, in France, given rise to a
noticeable expansion of municipal activities in the direction of economic
providence. In a number of more recent decisions, the Conseil d'Aitat
has recognized the propriety of such motivation, once or twice in fact
upholding a municipal measure solely on the basis of its contribution
to the economic welfare of the community. In the Mariole case,8 6 for
83. Hauriou stresses the fact that the contractual stipulations imposed by the central

departments engaged in public works often place heavy burdens upon the contractors.
As to the question of ways and means of combating clauses excessively onerous to the
entrepreneur, he suggests that "experience seems to reply in the negative". HAumioU,
PRPcis DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (I2th ed. 1933) 935, n. 63. See also Conseil d'!*tat,
March 30, i9o6, Dalloz, Rectwil Pgriodiqueet Critique, x9o8 III, 5; TExiER, LE CAHna
DES

CLAUSES ET CONDITIONS GANfRALES ImPOStES
PUBLICS (7th ed. I93I).

Aux

ENTREPRISES DR TRAVAUX

84. See supra p. 441.
85. For France, see Riesenfeld, Recent Developments of French Labor Law (1939)
23 MINN. L. REv. 407.

86. Conseil d'P-tat, March 23, 1923, 93 Recueil 277.
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instance, the Conseil d'Atat sanctioned a decision of the municipal
council of Havre concerning certain street reclassifications on the
ground that the council had been guided "only by considerations of the
commercial and industrial prosperity of the city and general interests of
87
its population.".
III

A British case illuminating the legal situation involved in our
theme, but more akin to the Caillette case than to the Utah case, arose
some fifteen years ago from the wage policy of the borough of Poplar,
one of the self-governing subdivisions of Greater London.8 8 Under the
law, the borough council was authorized to avail itself, in the management of its borough affairs, of an appropriate staff of officers and
workers, and to determine their remuneration as the council "may see
fit". The wage scale adopted for the municipal workers was considered
disproportionately high by the government auditor, one of the officials
employed by the Ministry of Health in the discharge of its supervisory
function over local authorities. The House of Lords, reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeals, sustained the auditor against the
borough council. Since the latter was dominated by the Labor Party,
the litigation and its outcome caused much heated discussion.8 9 Naturally, we are not concerned here with the political implications.
The dilemma facing the courts in the Poplar case is mirrored in
the reasons embraced by the different judges. Said Atkin, L. J., for
the Court of Appeals, in pondering the crucial provision of the statute:
"The first question that arises is whether this section gives the local
authority unfettered discretion as to the amount of wages, provided
they act bona fide; or whether their powers are limited to paying such
reasonable salaries and wages as they may think fit. In the latter view
the test of reasonableness would be an objective standard to which the
council must conform. In coming to a conclusion on this point, it is
desirable to recall the words of the section giving power to the local
authority to employ such servants 'as may be necessary.' To comply
with this section, must the council be able to satisfy some external
authority, the auditor or the court, that all the servants employed are
in fact necessary? Would it be open to the auditor to disallow the
payment for four charwomen out of forty-four if he thought forty
sufficient, or ten dustmen out of 144 if his experience led him to the
belief that the work could be done by 134? It appears to me that the
87. Id. at 278. See also Chavanon's comment on a similar justification of a still
more recent decision. (1937) 47 REv. Du DROIT PUBLIC 149, 150.
88. Rex v. Roberts, [1924] 1 K. B. 514, rev'd, [1924] 2 K. B. 675, rev'd sub nom.
Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A. C. 578.
89. For a pointed analysis of the decision of the House of Lords, see LASIKI,
STUDIES IN LAW AND POLITICS (1932)

202-222.
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final decision upon this point must rest with the local authority, they
acting in good faith. If this is true of the numbers and classes of
servants employed, I think it must also be true of the wages, always
assuming good faith."

90

In contrast with this construction, Lord Buckmaster, for the
House of Lords, attempted to lay down an objective test. Commenting
on the explanatory affidavit submitted by the borough council, he informed himself "that 41. a week was to be the minimum wage for adult
labour, that is without the least regard to what that labour might be. It
standardized men and women, not according to the duties which they
performed, but according to the fact that they were adults. It is this
that leads me to think that their [the council's] action cannot be supported, and that in fact they have not determined the payment as wages,
for they have eliminated the consideration both of the work to be done
and of the purchasing power of the sums paid, which they themselves
appear to regard as a relevant though not the dominant factor. Had
they stated that they determined, as a borough council, to pay the same
wage for the same work without regard to the sex or condition of the
person who performed it, I should have found it difficult to say that it
was not a proper exercise of their discretion. It was indeed argued
that this is what they did, but I find it impossible to extract that from
the statement contained in the affidavit. It appears to me, for the reasons which I have given, that they cannot have brought into account the
considerations which they say influenced them, and that they did not
base their decision upon the ground that the reward for work is the
value of the work reasonably and even generously measured, but that
they took an arbitrary principle and fixed an arbitrary sum which was
not a real exercise of the discretion imposed upon them by the
statute."

91

go. Rex v. Roberts, [1924] 2 K. B. 695, 724.
9'. Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A. C. 578, 589-590. Still more emphatic was his
colleague, Lord Sumner: "The purpose, however, of the whole audit is to ensure wise
and prudent administration and to recover for the council's funds money which should
not have been taken out of them. If, having examined the expenditure and found clear
proof of bad faith, which admittedly would open the account, the auditor further found
that the councillors' evil minds had missed their mark, and the expenditure itself was
right, then the expenditure itself would not be 'contrary to law' and could not be dis-

allowed. Bad faith admittedly vitiates the council's purported exercise of its discretion,
but the auditor is not confined to asking if the discretion, such as it may be, has been
honestly exercised. He has to restrain expenditure within proper limits. His mission
is to find if there is any excess over what is reasonable. I do not find any words limiting his functions merely to the case of bad faith, or obliging him to leave the ratepayers unprotected from the effects on their pockets of honest stupidity or unpractical
idealism." Id. at 604. And finally, Lord Carson's plunge: "As regards the reasons
already referred to, of Atkin, L. J., I am inclined to think, upon further consideration,
that the admission that bad faith is not alleged or that the council exercised their discretion honestly has been misapplied. I do not myself know what these expressions are
meant to cover, but, having regard to the statements made in the affidavit of the auditor
that the council, in the exercise of their statutory powers, had not paid due regard to
the interests of the ratepayers, whose funds they administered, had imposed unreason-
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One cannot read Lord Buckmaster's deduction without sensing the
strain in its structure. Is it not the very purpose of a minimum wage
schedule to provide a floor beneath which compensation for labor is not
permitted to drop? If this is true, it appears plain that a graduation
according to type of work performed is neither an essential characteristic of a minimum wage measure nor required from the point of view
of sound municipal finance. The establishment of a minimum wage
inevitably bestows greater benefits upon the lowest income groups. A
uniform minimum wage is still less favorable to the upper brackets of
labor, and hence may lead actually to a saving for the municipal treasury, as compared with a graduated scheme setting special rates for the
top groups.
Even more arresting is the fashion in which Lord Buckmaster
extricates from the affidavit of the borough council his personal hunch
as to the council's real motive, irrespective of the explanation urged
upon him earnestly by the council itself. There is little to commend
this kind of inquisition, which in effect substitutes the court's discretion
for that of the elected council. 92 In the wise phrase of Scrutton, L. J.:
"A wide margin should be allowed for error of judgment, not amounting to misconduct, or for deliberate policy, not being illegal, with which
93
the auditor cannot interfere".
Before we examine the implications of this proposition, let us indicate what it does not encompass. A Swiss case within the area of our
investigation may serve as the prototype. A contractor, duly armed
with a municipal building permit, had begun construction for a private
party. Use of a steam shovel aroused protests among the working
population. The municipal building bureau, stirred by the protests,
urged the contractor to discontinue work with the steam shovel, pointing to the unemployment problem in the community. Meanwhile, the
local union called for a protest meeting at the site of the construction.
In an emergency meeting of the municipal council, its socialist
member announced union reprisals in the form of a forcible removal
able charges upon the funds and made payments which were far in excess of those
necessary to obtain the services of those required and to maintain a high standard of
efficiency, and were thus in reality gifts to their employees in addition to remuneration
for their services, I find it difficult to come to a conclusion that the admissions referred
to meant anything more than that the council honestly thought that they were entitled
to take the course which they did take, and in my opinion it was open to the auditor,
upon coming to the conclusions as stated in his affidavit, to draw the inference that the
board were not engaged in merely fixing a rate of wages, but were affected by a consideration which could not be held to come within the ambit of the discretion entrusted to
them." Id. at 617-618.
92. Even though the conflict itself arose between the auditor and the borough council, there is manifest in the decision of the House of Lords an"ominous tendency toward
fiscal superintendence of local authorities. In a sense, the decision testifies to the growing importance of the permanent ministerial personnel in the conduct of local government. This factor is not sufficiently stressed by Laski in his critical comments. See
LASKI, loc. cit. supra note 8g.
93. Rex v. Roberts, [r924] 2 K. B. 695, 719.
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of the shovel from the site, unless the council would require the contractor to cease work with it. The council, "complementing" the original building permit, issued this prohibition. The contractor brought
recourse before the cantonal council of state, which upheld the prohibition as a measure destined to improve employment conditions in the
locality and thus to maintain public order. At the same time, the
council of state passed a decree prohibiting the use of mechanical
shovels within the canton, except by specific permission of the municipal
authorities. On appeal, the Federal Supreme Court reversed the decision and annulled the decree. 94
The court took for its point of departure the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of trade and industry.9 5 Under the Federal Constitution, the cantons may take police measures for the protection of
public order, but they have no authority to impose regulatory restrictions upon the freedom of trade and industry. The court considered
that the decisions of the municipal council and the cantonal council of
state were primarily directed toward the unemployment problem. Any
such effort to correct by police measures the effects of competition
between manual labor and machine labor was held irreconcilable with
the Federal Constitution. All preventive or repressive measures taken
in the exercise of the cantonal police power must be "appropriate,
adapted to the circumstances, and directed against those who imperil
the public order".
In the case at hand, the authorities were entitled to take steps
against those threatening to disturb the peace, but not against the contractor. At best, a temporary prohibition could have been justifiable,
until the excitement had died down or the authorities had been able to
restore order effectively. The mere fear of disturbances is legally
irrelevant. Being in contradiction with the Federal Constitution, the
assailed decisions cannot be based on the cantonal constitution or on
municipal regulations concerning police supervision over construction
work. The municipal council might have lawfully prohibited the use
of the steam shovel had its employment threatened the health or the
safety of the workers or the public. The council as a police authority
was, however, without power to take such a step in response to local
feeling or in the interest of relieving unemployment.96
94. Travelletti c. Conseil d'!Ptat du Canton du Valais, June 11, 1937, 63 (I) Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts 213.
95. Swrrz. CONST. Art. XXXI.
96. The appeal correctly termed the attacked decisions "arbitrary". Travelletti c.
Conseil d'ttat du Canton du Valais, June 11, 1937, 63 (I) Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts 213, 216.
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IV

The Swiss case illustrates a legal principle common to all Continental European systems of administrative law. In brief, it is this:
the police is not empowered to pursue economic policy. 97

It follows

that police authorities may not take measures in order to protect manual
labor against the displacement by technological equipment; or in order
to mitigate unemployment; or in order to maintain the existing level
of employment.9 8 These rules, however, while recognized by France's
droit administratifand the German doctrine of Verwaltungsrecht alike,

find their justification in the specific character of police tasks: the preservation of public order. In other words, the police power, in Continental European terminology, is a concept far narrower in meaning
than is true of American usage. The concept is confined to the area of
public safety.
No doubt the restraints imposed upon the police, as far as the
quest of economic objectives is concerned, entirely accords with practical considerations. In the first place, under the auspices of representative government, we can safely curb police benevolence because issues
such as that of machine versus man are adjudged with greater authority
in the forum of the elected legislature. Second, in the era of functional
specialization, 9 administrative accountability and control, as much as
the "rule of law", require police authorities to refrain from roaming
beyond their province. And third, there is little in the general character
of police work that would appear particularly conducive to sound
economic perspective. 0 0
A sharp line of distinction, however, must be drawn between
police decisions in this narrow sense and policies adopted by municipal
legislatures. In the Swiss case, it is true, the contested measure was
taken by a municipal council. But here the council acted as the police
authority, not within the area of municipal self-government. Exercising its police power with both eyes on economic issues, the council
permited itself to be pulled across the boundaries of lawful motivation.10 ' From the point of view of office psychology, it is interesting
that a leading authority on Swiss constitutional law 102 has found the
lay element in Switzerland's administrative structure more inclined to
97. See DREWS AND LASSAR,

ALLGEFMEINES POLIZEIRECHT, 2

VON BRAUCHITSCH,

VERWALTUNGSGESFTZE FUR PREUSSEN (22d ed. 1932) I, 19.
98. 38 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerchts 291, 300.
99. See Morstein Marx, The BureaucraticState (1939) i REv. OF POLITICS 457 et

seq.
ioo. As J~ze observes for France, "bureaucrats have very inadequate experience in
practical economic matters". J~ze, supra note 58, at 262.

I01. See Morstein Marx, mipra note 3, passim.
z02. FLEINER, SCHWEIZERISCHE UND DEUTSCHE STAATSAUFFASSUNG

(1929)

15.
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swing the stick of government power than he saw borne out in "civil
service states" such as Germany prior to the advent of Hitler.
As to the scope of municipal self-determination, pre-Hitler Germany, on the other hand, respected the "universality rule". The rule
implied "local freedom of initiative in the pursuit of the common
good", 10 3 irrespective of special legislation. Municipal authorities were
"placed in a position to include in their activity any purpose conducive
to the promotion of the general welfare or the material and other interests of their citizenry". 10 4 Under the "universality rule", the presumption of law was "in favor of municipal power to deal administratively
with local problems and set up appropriate agencies, save for those
spheres recognized as the realm of central authority". 0 5 It is not surprising that during the economic depression of more recent years the
"universality rule" gave rise to extensive municipal reemployment
measures.' 0 6 The legality of individual features of these measures did
not meet judicial challenge.
To revert to the general plane: aside from the German example,
there is much to be said for local autonomy freer of court superintendence than it is today in the United States. "Self-government cannot be
learned except by the trial-and-error method." 107 Or, in the words of
an outstanding municipal executive of Republican Germany, "Local
governments must have freedom even to do occasionally something
foolish".' 0 8 The need for reemployment programs, moreover, is as
acute today as it was in the initial phase of the Great Depression. As
long as a systematic and fully effective attack upon the unemployment
problem on the part of the Federal Government has not materialized, 09
local authorities will be pushed into improvisation." 0
See Morstein Marx, Germany, in ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 49, at 253.
io4 . KORMANN, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE PRAxis DES DEUTSCHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTS (2d ed. by List, 1930) x8.
105. Morstein Marx, Germany, in ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 49, at 253.
io6. See KRAus, WoRx RELIEF IN GERMANY (934) passin, especially 9o et seq.
io7. See WELLS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 120.
io8. Cited in Morstein Marx, Germany, in ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 49, at 253.
Iog. We may well ponder the following statement by Park Commissioner Robert
Moses in New York: "The WPA is a decaying institution. It is a crime against the
men themselves to continue it much longer. Many of them will never be able to compete with their fellows in private industry; others may still be salvaged before it is too
late. Generally speaking, relief projects are getting thinner and poorer throughout the
country. There is not enough money for plans, material, equipment, competent supervision, and skilled labor to do worth-while things. This cannot be proven in the face of
the anguished cries of supporters of the system, but the average citizen knows it is so
and cannot be talked out of his dislike of it. Work relief cannot be dropped all at once.
It is being cut down gradually, but even this is not the answer. The answer lies in a
new approach to public works by contract and by government loans to wholly or partially self-liquidating public and semi-public projects and, above all, in the prompt application of stimulants to the resumption of private business." MosES, THEORY AND
PacrIcE IN PoLITcs (1939) 74-75.
i"o. As a municipal manager has put it: "Now (i939) many cities find their public
works really needing more attention than local finance will be able to provide in a
decade. As the relief situation continues, the physical condition of public works be1o3.
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We said at the beginning that such improvisation has little to
commend it from an economic point of view.'11 There are, however,
other considerations to be taken into account in reaching a conclusion
concerning the legal side of the problem. One of these is encountered
in the apodictic statement that in the execution of public works the
municipality occupies the same position as a private individual contracting for identical purposes with the entrepreneur. The assertion is not
devoid of what looks like a precedential basis,. 2 but it conflicts with
broader principles.
For it is irreconcilable with the character of public authority to
place governmental bodies on a par with the individual as far as freedom of action is concerned. The individual is entitled to free choice of
conduct under the law. This freedom is his as a matter of right. It
is a freedom qualified in its concrete manifestations by the limitations
that arise from the lawful exercise of administrative power. It is a
freedom yielding to the legitimate demands of the public interest, without ever surrendering its substance. Governmental bodies, on the other
hand, as guardians of the public interest, are held to their specific mandate. The scope of their activity is not derived from any rights such
as buttress the legal status of the individual. Their initiative is never
free, but conditioned on authorization. 1 3 They may not pursue an end
alien to the purpose underlying their creation.
All governmental bodies are instrumentalities of the public interest.
As such, they are dominated by the concrete objectives to which they
have been dedicated. Administrative authority, therefore, even where
it is granted in broad language, does not admit of being construed as
freedom of option comparable to that enjoyed by the individual.
Authorization is always for a defined or definable objective. In this
respect, all governmental bodies are establishments designed for social
use. They find their ultimate justification in serving the interest of the
individual as a member of the organized community. The service
function of administrative power has nothing in common with the
autonomy of private motivation. Individual right and regulatory
power are not of the same fabric. They are counterparts, mutually
limiting each other. The exercise of power is controlled by explicit or
implicit statutory directives, not by volition invoking right.
comes worse. The saving grace is that certain kinds of work, requiring a large percentage of man power, have been projected into the future to such an extent as to relieve
communities of such construction financing for a long time." HODGES, CITY MANAGEMENT (1939) 523. Cf. in general on the organizational and managerial side, SToNE,
THE MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPAL PUBLIC WORKS (1939).

III. See supra p. 425.

112. The following leading cases are usually cited: Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207
(19o3); People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. I54, io8 N. E. 427 (I915); see Note (1915) i5
COL. L. REV. 263.
113. See Morstein Marx, supra note 3, Passim.
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True enough, "it is one of the pillars of modern political theory
that governmental power must operate in the interest of the community
at large and thereby justify itself". 114 But the interest orientation of
government does not emerge simply from the ends served by government; it arises in the first instance from the revocable mandate under
which government carries out its policies. Authorization and service
orientation of government maintain therefore a reciprocal relationship.
It is from authorization that the service function of government is
derived. And what in this respect applies to government in general
applies as well to all public bodies, large and small. 1 5
In an earlier paper 11 6 I have attempted to outline some of the rules
that must be deduced from the key position occupied by authorization
in the entire domain of public administration. In particular, I tried to
delimit the area of lawful motivation for the exercise of the licensing
power. The test proposed was not the administrator's good faith nor
his conception of sound and practical procedure, but the nexus between
the discretionary act and those objectives encompassed in the statutory
authorization. "The question whether or not a discretionary act has
overstepped these legal boundaries is a question of law and not of discretion." 117 In deciding such questions, however, judicial bodies
depend on a considerable degree of insight into the administrative
process. If the judges, as is the case in the composition of Continental
European administrative courts, are largely drafted from the administrative service, and if, in turn, the university training for the adminis114. In the words of a Danish authority on administrative law:
TIGE VERWALTUNGSAXTE

(1927)

258.

ANDERSEN,

UNGfiL-

115. A general authorization qualified by provisions requiring a regulation of the
manner in which the authority is to be exercised is conditioned on the adoption of such
a regulation. To give an illustration, a Florida statute contains the following: "The
City Manager shall make all purchases for the City in the vnanner provided by ordinance and shall, under such rules and regulations as may be provided by ordinance, sell
all personal property of the City not needed or that may have become unsuitable for
public use. Before making any purchase or sale, the City Manager shall give opportunity for competition under such rules and regulations as may be established by ordinance." Fla. Spec. Sess. Laws 1931, c. 15505, § 1og. (Italics added.) In Brown v.
City of St. Petersburg, iir Fla. 718, 153 So. 140 (933), the Supreme Court of Florida
held that in the absence of a purchasing ordinance the city manager could not be considered authorized to make any purchasing contracts; that on the other hand, in making
purchases on the basis of a purchasing ordinance, the city manager was not required to
insure competition, unless directed by ordinance to do so, "since the last clause of this
section is merely a permissive limitation that may or may not be imposed by ordinance".
The court, in other words, did not read the "may" in the closing passage as "shall". On
this point, one authority comments as follows: "The court must have concluded that
under.the peculiar public policy of the state, declaring that all cities organized under the
commission system are primarily to be regarded as business corporations (Kaufman v.
City of Tallahassee, [1922] 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697), the legislature intended to leave it
discretionary with the commissioners to what extent they should limit this power of the
city manager." Tooke, Municipal Powers, I MUNICIPAL YEAR Boox (1934) 57, !8.
The present writer inclines to the view that the result reached by the court does not
necessarily rest on the above mentioned "public policy of the state".
116. See Morstein Marx, supranote 3.
117. I RUCK, SCHWEIZERISCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (2d ed. 1939) 166.
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trative career stresses juridical disciplines 118 including administrative
law, 1 9 judicial inquiry into administrative motivation will not be illinformed and haphazard. The French Conseil d'Atat, for instance, has
justly been acclaimed for its "circumspection" 120 in the examination of
the administrator's mind. The same may well be said of Prussia's
Supreme Administrative Court.
Indeed, otherwise there might be a real danger that "the spontaneity of the discretionary power is killed". 121 The administrator
"must respect the law, but must not thereby be imprisoned by too strict
rules that would impede his action: in order to have a just administration one would have no longer an efficient administration. That would
What is suggested here
mean to drift from Charybdis to Scylla".'
concerning the administrator applies with double force to municipal
authorities exercising the powers of self-government. As Atkin, L. J.,
expressed it in the Poplar case: "Surely it is not too much to say that
in matters which directly and mainly concern the people of the county,
who have the right to choose those whom they think best fitted to represent them in their local government bodies, such representatives may be
123
trusted to understand their own requirements better than judges".
In fact, the soundness of this argument has found recognition by the
same court that supplied us with our starting point: the Supreme Court
24
of Utah.1
II8. For a historical survey, see Friedrich, The Continental Tradition of Training
Administratorsin Law and Jurisprudence (939) II J.MoD. HIsT. 129 et seq. See also
MORSTEIN MARX, CIVIL SERVICE IN GERMANY, CIVIL SERVICE ABROAD (1935)

210, 223

et seq.
iig. As the entire body of law controlling the conduct of public administration.
120. HAURIOU, op. cit. supra note 83, at 444.
121. Id. at 443.
122. Waline, Le pouvoir discr9tionnairede l'adininistrationet sa linlitation par le
contr6le jurisdictionnel (930) 47 REv. Du DROIT PUBLIC 197, 223. (Italics are
Waline's.)
123. Rex v. Roberts, [1924] 2 K. B. 695, 727.
In this case,
124. Shulte v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 292, 10 P. (2d) 625 (932).
a taxpayer sued to prohibit the city from proceeding with the performance of a contract for the construction of a storm sewer on the ground that the contract had not been
awarded to the lowest bidder. Here, too, because of the nature of the fund, no competitive bidding was required by statute, see supra p. 430. On a $ii8,ooo project, the
winning bid exceeded the lowest by $267.36. The lowest bidder, however, was a California resident, who owned no property in Utah, although he enjoyed a good reputation
as a contractor. The accepted bidder resided in the city, was financially responsible,
owned ample equipment, and had satisfactorily completed 29 contracts for the city,
13 involving sewer construction. Holding the award to be valid, the court said: "Independent of any statute regulating the awarding of contracts for the construction of
public improvements, the city commissioners are required to act in good faith, without
fraud, collusion, corruption, or palpable abuse of discretion, and with due fidelity to the
public interests . . . The general rule deducible from the adjudicated cases and
text-writers is to the effect that, where there is no statutory limitation upon the power
of the proper officers of a city to let contracts for public improvements, such officers
have a broad discretion. Courts refuse to interfere with their control of the matters so
long as they do not exceed the power delegated to them, or invade private rights or act
in bad faith or palpably abuse their discretion. A similar rule prevails in most juris-
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While on the one hand discretionary measures must retain for their
validity a distinct nexus with the objectives encompassed in the statutory authorization, there remains on the other hand a latitude of judgment as to the emphasis to be placed on different relevant factors in
framing the discretionary decision. More than that: discretion may
err, may misjudge, may rest on wrong assumptions-all depending on
the standard of reconsideration. Faulty discretion is not identical with
abuse of discretion inspired by improper motives. The latter is lawlessness, for the objective of the discretionary act transcends the scope
of authorization. The former operates within the statutory mandate,
but, viewed from a different vantage point, fails to reach its lawful
objective or approaches it either too meekly or too fervently or goes
through motions more extensive than appear to be warranted, to give
only a few examples. At bottom, we are faced here with a conflict of
judgments: that of the insider against that of the outsider. And the
outsider, in the last analysis, is the court.
12 5
The situation is brought into sharp relief in the Utah case.
The "general welfare clause" 1 2 6 provided the board of commissioners of
Salt Lake City with ample discretionary power to determine the modus
operandi of the public works to be undertaken, quite apart from the
"regulation" of the construction in the narrow sense.127 Yet the way
the board, in designing the modus operandi,gave recognition to the local
unemployment problem collided with the notions of municipal economy
entertained by the court. The dissenting opinion put the issue in its
correct perspective: "I do not pretend to say that the requirement of
hand labor instead of machinery . . . is ordinarily an economical or
social policy. That is for the board of commissioners to say in the light
of the conditions now existing." 128 There is wisdom in such selflimitation.
The general rule, universally applied in Continental European
administrative law, is well stated in one of the most progressive codes
of administrative justice, the Administrative Judicature Act adopted in
1921 by the city-state of Hamburg, Germany. 129 Its Section 46 reads:
"In so far as administrative agencies are authorized by statute to exercise discretionary power, action cannot be brought, except for special
dictions under statutes which require that contracts for public improvements be let to
the lowest responsible bidder. In such case the officers whose duty it is to award the
contracts are vested with discretion in determining who is the most responsible and best
bidder. . . ." Id. at 299, 300, 10 P. (2d) at 628.
125. See supra p. 426.
126. See supra p. 431.
127. See supra p. 428.
128.
129.

Italics added. See mpra p. 433.
For the (abridged) text of the law, see Morstein Marx, Die Verfassungs- und

Verwaltungsrechtsentwicklung in den drei Hansestddten Hamburg, Bremen und Liibeck,
I918-I928 (1928)

16

JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN REcHTS 51,

75 et seq.

454

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

statutory provisions, on the ground that sound discretion would have
required a different decision". The clause is reminiscent of an earlier
decision of the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court which enunciated the principle as follows: "The administrative court cannot superimpose its discretion over that of the [administrator] . . . provided

only that the [administrator] has been guided discernibly by objective
[administrative] considerations". 1 30
Patently, the distinction is not between reasonable and unreasonable exercise of discretion. Reliance on these categories invites misunderstandings as to both the extent and the character of judicial control
over discretionary measures. It is not the task of the judge to identify
himself with the results of administrative discretion; to accept for himself these results as reasonable; or otherwise to invalidate the measure
as unreasonable. Lawful exercise of discretion may, as we saw, cross
the border between reasonableness and unreasonableness, as drawn by
the court, without becoming altogether irrational and hence arbitrary.
The mere conflict of judgments conditioning the concrete manifestation
of discretion is not to be resolved arbitrarily in favor of the court.
130. 29

Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 442, 446.

